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IN THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 
DOCKET NO. 73-8174 
ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, ET AL. 
Plaintiffs-Appellants 
v. 
TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY, ET AL. 
Defendants-Appellees 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
Eastern District of Tennessee, Northern Division 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 
COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE CASE 
TVA is dissatisfied with plaintiffs' statement of 
the case because it fails to describe either the reasons for 
the Tellico project and the benefits which will result from 
it, or the state of its completion. We believe these matters 
are of vital importance to an understanding of the case. 
Major benefits from the project include navigation, 
flood control, electric power, recreation, enhanced employment, 
and other general economic benefits. TVA estimated that its 
construction would result in private investment of $265,000,000 
in new industry in the Tellico area over the next 25 years, 
creating some 6,600 new jobs in three economically depressed 
east Tennessee counties which have been plagued by unemploy-
ment, low income levels, and mass out-migration of their young 
people. The total annual benefits are estimated at $7,410,000, 
which includes the following major items: navigation 
$400,000, flood control $505,000, electric power $400,000, 
recreation $1,440,000, and enhanced employment $3,650,000. 
' 
The uncontradicted evidence was that in March of 1973, during 
a single flood, the Tellico project, had it been completed, 
would have averted flood damages of over $15,000,000 to the 
City of Chattanooga alone. 
Construction on the project began in March 1967, 
and is now one-half complete. To date over $45,000,000 has 
been appropriated toward its completion--currently estimated 
to cost $69,000,000--and over $35,000,000 has been spent. 
The concrete portion of the dam has been completed; various 
roads and bridges have been relocated and constructed; 80 
percent of the land for the project has been acquired; and 
most of the families who lived in the project area have 
moved. 
Plaintiffs' statement of the case also includes a 
discussion of the historical aspects of the area which is 
grossly exaggerated. There are no Indian villages within 
2 
the project area, only former sites which were abandoned 
over 200 years ago. The undisputed evidence and the EIS 
show that these sites received no attention from the state, 
federal or local authorities, the Indians, or anyone else 
prior to the Tellico project, whereas as a part of the proj-
ect activity a great deal has been done to locate and pre-
serve evidence of the Cherokee past which might otherwise 
have been lost. See EIS I-1-8, 9; I-1-35-38; I-3-51; and 
II-9-1-5 and discussion infra, pages 29-32. Also, 
although plaintiffs point out that the present State Admin-
istration is on record as favoring abandonment of the proj-
ect, they fail to point out that the undisputed proof showed 
that the two previous State Administrations not only favored 
the project but actively urged congressional funding of it. 
It was not until after $30,000,000 had been expended that the 
new State Administration opposed the project. Additionally, 
plaintiffs fail to point out that the residents of the three-
county area in which the project is located are overwhelmingly 
in favor of it as are their elected officials and the present 
Tennessee House of Representatives. On March 15, 1973, the 
Tennessee House of Representatives adopted a formal resolution 
on behalf of "all the people of Tennessee" endorsing the proj-
ect and urging its early completion. This resolution was 
filed as Exhibit 71. 
The environmental statement for the Tellico project, 
which was filed with CEQ on February 10, 1972, and which is 
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the subject of this lawsuit, contains over 600 pages. During 
the four-day trial before the Honorable Robert L. Taylor, 18 
witnesses testified and 130 exhibits were received in evi-
dence. After receiving post-trial briefs, Judge Taylor 
entered a 27-page memorandum holding that the preliminary 
injunction he had previously granted should be dissolved, and 
stating in part: 
In dissolving the injunction against pro-
ceeding with the Tellico project, we have 
found that TVA has now complied with NEPA. 
The final impact statement discloses the 
significant impacts to result from the 
project and discusses the reasonable alter-
natives available. There has been on the 
part of TVA in reaching its decision a good 
faith consideration and balancin~ of environ-
mental factors. An attempt has een made 
to mit1 ate certain of the environmental 
erent 1n procee 1ng with the 
Further, we have concluded that 
to the standards set forth in 
sect1ons an o NEPA t e 
actual balance of costs and benefits struck 
was not arbitrar and ave sufficient 
weight to environmenta values Memorandum, 
pp. 26-27] .1 
On November 1, 1973, the court entered final judg-
ment for TVA, saying: 
. defendants have com lied full with 
the prov1sions o t e Nat1ona Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969 and all other 
apllicable laws at issue with re~ard to the 
Te lico Dam Proiect, that all re ief sought 
by plaintiffs s ould be denied, the prelim-
inary injunction entered herein on January 
11, 1972, dissolved, the case dismissed, and 
judgment entered for the defendants; it is 
therefore Ordered that judgment be and it 
hereby is, entered for the defendants in 
1 Emphasis added herein unless otherwise noted. 
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ARGUMENT 
Introduction 
Plaintiffs' brief, in our view, consistently con-
fuses issues of fact and law, and summarizes testimony of 
plaintiffs' witnesses without making clear that such testi-
mony was contradicted by witnesses for TVA. The district 
court expressly found that TVA's final environmental state-
ment was a "detailed statement" within the meaning of NEPA--
i.e., that it discusses adequately the five subject areas 
specified in section 102(2)(C) of NEPA; that TVA considered, 
and the EIS discusses, the reasonable alternatives available; 
that TVA reached its decision to proceed with the project 
after a good-faith consideration and balancing of environ-
mental !actors; that TVA had attempted to mitigate environ-
mental losses; and that the actual balance of costs and 
benefits struck was not arbitrary and gave sufficient weight 
to environmental values. 
These are essentially factual issues involving 
expert opinions, and are basically what the trial was all 
about. Witnesses for each side testified at length on various 
aspects of these issues, and the district court made its 
5 
findings after considering their testimony as well as the 
exhibits. In such circumstances, it is hornbook law, as 
expressly stated in Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, that: 
Findings of fact shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge of the credibility 
of the witnesses. 
See also Zenith Corp. v. Hazeltine, 395 U.S. 100 (1969); 
J. A. Jones Constr. Co. v. Englert Eng'r. Co., 438 F.2d 3 
(6th Cir. 1971); National Labor Relations Board v. S. E. 
Nichols, 472 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1972). As said in Zenith 
Corp., supra: 
In applying the clearly erroneous standard 
to the findings of a district court sitting 
without a jury, appellate courts must con-
stantly have in mind that their function 
is not to decide factual issues de novo. 
The authority of an appellate court, when 
reviewing the findings of a judge as well 
as those of a jury, is circumscribed by the 
deference it must give to decisions of the 
trier of the fact, who is usually in a 
superior position to appraise and weigh the 
evidence. The question for the apBellate 
court under Rule S2(a) is not whet er it 
would have made the findings the trial court 
did, but whether "on the entire evidence 
[itl is left with the definite and firm 
conviction that a mistake has been committed" 
[395 U.S. at 123]. 
With this basic principle in mind, we turn to the 
specific points raised in plaintiffs' brief. 
6 
I 
The District Court Did Not 
Err with Res¥ect to the 
Standard o Review. 
Plaintiffs argue that Judge Taylor did not apply 
the proper standard of review as to the economic benefit and 
cost analysis. They say he should have applied the standard 
adopted by the Eighth and Fourth Circuits, but failed to do 
so. In this they are mistaken. Judge Taylor did apply the 
standard of the Eighth and Fourth Circuits, but that standard 
is not what plaintiffs say it is. Plaintiffs have failed to 
discuss the latest cases from these circuits or to recognize 
the distinction which these circuits have clearly drawn be-
tween the analysis of economic benefits and costs required 
under Senate Document No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Exhibit 
56 in this case), and the analysis of environmental factors 
required under NEPA. There is a fundamental difference be-
tween the two types of analyses, but plaintiffs have scram-
bled the two together as though they were the same. 
In water related projects (such as Tellico) federal 
agencies are confronted with two different types of benefit 
and cost analyses--an economic (dollar and cents) analysis 
under Senate Document No. 97, and a broader environmental 
(good versus bad) analysis under NEPA. The purpose of the 
economic analysis under Senate Document No. 97 is to allow 
the executive and legislative branches to make informed 
7 
judgments as to the desirability of a water resources project 
before money is appropriated for its construction. The basic 
theory underlying this type of analysis is that the Office of 
Management and Budget will not recommend, and Congress will 
not make, an appropriation of money for such a project unless 
it is satisfied that the economic benefits exceed the costs. 
TVA made such a benefit-cost analysis of Tellico before Con-
gress authorized the project by making the initial appropria-
tion for it. This economic analysis under Senate Document 
No. 97 is wholly different and apart from the environmental 
analysis required by NEPA, and this difference is recognized 
by the courts. The general rule is that the courts will not 
review the economic analysis made under Senate Document No. 
97 because that is a legislative matter for Congress. 
Contrary to what plaintiffs suggest in their brief, 
the Eighth and Fourth Circuits apply a different standard 
of review with respect to economic analysis under Senate 
Document No. 97 than they do with respect to the environ-
mental analysis under NEPA. Plaintiffs rely upon the deci-
sion in the Gillham Dam case, Environmental Defense Fund v. 
Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. 
denied, 5 ERC 1416 (1973). That case did not deal with 
economic costs and benefits under Senate Document No. 97, 
but only with the environmental analysis under NEPA. The 
decision shows on its face that plaintiffs' claim for review 
of economic costs and benefits was dismissed by the district 
8 
court, which decision was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. 
Indeed, the district court decision by Judge Eisele in that 
case states specifically that economic costs and benefits 
under the Flood Control Act (33 U.S.C. § 70l(a)), as im-
plemented by Senate Document No. 97, are not subject to 
judicial review: 
. . . The Court does net believe that the 
plaintiffs have stated a claim for which 
relief can be granted under its "Fourth 
Cause of Action" based upon 33 U.S.C. § 
70l(a). It is for the Congress to deter-
mine, in authorizing such a project and in, 
thereafter, making subsequent appropriations 
therefor, whether the benefits are "in 
excess of the estimated costs." The Court 
does not believe that it has the authority 
to enjoin the expenditure of appropriated 
funds upon a showing that the benefits are 
less than the estimated cost. The plain-
tiffs and others are free to bring such 
matters to the attention of the legislative 
branch at the time any new appropriation 
for this project is proposed. Indeed, they 
could bring the matter to the attention of 
Congress at this time with the hope of 
obtaining legislation which would prevent 
the expenditure of funds alreadl appropri-
ated (which would obviously inc ude those 
needed for the construction of the dam 
proper and the clearing of the lake). The 
methods of calculating cost-benefit ratios 
are innumerable and in many cases esoteric. 
The Court's judgment as to sound procedures 
in this regard might well not be in accord 
with the judgment of Congress. And, as 
stated above, the Court does not believe it 
should, in any event, attempt to substitute 
its judgment for that of the legislature 
[Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of ¥9,i' 325 F. Supp. 728, 739-40 (E.D. Ark. ); emphasis by the court]. 
In a later case involving the Cache River, Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972), 
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the Eighth Circuit had before it the question of the standard 
of review applicable both to the general NEPA analysis and 
the economic analysis under Senate Document No. 97. As to 
the NEPA analysis, the court applied the earlier Gillham Dam 
standard, saying: 
We held in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. 
v. Corps of Engineers of the United States 
Army, supbi at 397, that District Courts 
have an o igation to review substantive 
agency decisions on the merits to determine 
if they are in accord with NEPA. 
The review is a limited one for the purpose 
of determining whether the agency reached 
its decision after a full, good faith con-
sideration of environmental factors made 
under the standards set forth in §§ 101 and 
102 of NEPA; and whether the actual balance 
of costs and benefits struck by the agency 
accordinf to these standards was arbitrary 
or clear y gave insufficient weight to en-
vironmental factors. Environmental Defense 
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of the 
United States Army, supra. 
We caution, as we did in Environmental De-
fense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of 
the United States Army, supra at 300, that: 
"* * * Although this inquiry into the 
facts is to be searching and careful, the 
ultimate standard of review is a narrow-Dne. 
The court is not em owered to substitute its 
ju gment or t at o t e agency. 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
401 U.S. 402, 416 [2 ERC 1250] . (1971) 
[pp. 352-53]. 
As to the standard of review applicable to economic benefits 
and costs, however, the court applied a wholly different 
rule: 
10. 
The complaint specifically alleges that the 
costs exceed the benefits for this project 
and that the lives of people would be ad-
versely affected by the project 1 s completion. 
However, this project was authorized many 
years ago by Congress on the basis of its 
determination that the benefits of the proj-
ect exceed the costs. We do not think that 
the statement of policy in § 70la can be 
used as a vehicle for continuin evaluation 
o t e project y t e courts. 
We point out, however, that the relief re-
quested by the plaintiffs under § 70la is 
partiallx available under NEPA. To fully 
comply with NEPA, the Corps must reappraise 
the costs and benefits of the project in 
light of the policies of environmental-pro-
tection found in NEPA. As we have stated, 
a decision to proceed with channelization is 
.reviewable in the District Court to deter-
mine whether the actual balance of costs and 
benefits struck by the agencl according to 
the standards of §§ 101 and 02 of NEPA was 
arbitrar or clearl ave insufficient wei ht F. at 5 
The rule in the Fourth Circuit is the same, and is 
stated by Judge Dalton in Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 5 
ERC 1283 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd "on the basis of the district 
court's opinion," F.2d (4th Cir., Sept. 18, 1973), 
as follows: 
The sole purpose of NEPA is to ensure that 
the environmental effects of a project are 
given full and adequate consideration by 
the decision maker. 
Calculations of B/C ratios under the Flood 
Control Act and under NEPA are different. 
With respect to the Flood Control Act, the 
Senate passed a document entitled "Policies, 
Standards, and Procedures in the Formula-
tion, Evaluation, and Review of Plans for 
the Use of Water and Related Land Resources", 
S.Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). 
This document sets forth in detail the 
11 
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procedures and criteria which various agen-
cies must use to determine the B/C ratio of 
a project. It has been held that because 
of the innumerable number of methods of de-
riving them, B/C ratios, computed under 33 
U.S.C. § 70la, are not judicially reviewable, 
but are solely a matter for Congressional 
determination. United States v. West Virginia 
Power Co., 122 F.2d 733 (4th Cir. 1941), cert. 
denied, 314 U.S. 683 (1941); Sierra Club v. 
Froehlke, F. Supp. [ 5 ERC 1033] (S.D. 
TeL 1973);~ironmentar-Defense Fund v. 
Corps of Engineers of the United States Army, 
325 F.Supp. 728, 740 [2 ERC 1260](E.D. Ark. 
1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 [4 ERC 1721](8th 
Cir. 1972). 
The method of determining B/C ratios under 
NEPA is much broader than under Senate Docu-
ment No. 97. Costs which a court might 
determ1ne should be included under NEPA stan-
dards, might not be included under the Con-
gressional standards of Senate Document No. 
97. In the court's opinion the NEPA B/C ratio, 
rather than itself being the determining or 
decidin factor in cases brou ht under NEPA, 
is to e use on ~ to ena e t e court an 
other decision ma ers to determine whether 
all environmental factors of a ro'ect have 
een g1ven a equate cons1 eration. 
Judge Taylor applied the same standard of review 
in the present case as the Fourth and Eighth Circuits did in 
12 
the cases cited above. As to the NEPA review, he quoted the 
Eighth Circuit's decision in Gillham Dam, saying: 
This Court, therefore, must decide whether 
NEPA gives plaintiffs the right to challenge 
the decision to continue with the project as 
designated. We conclude that it does. 
After initially limiting review to an agency's 
procedural compliance, several circuits began 
recognizing the right of plaintiffs withi~0 limits to attack the underlying decision. 
A leading case, acknowledging this right and 
defining the standard of judicial review, is 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., 
U. S. Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). 
There the Court held that: 
"When NEPA is involved, the reviewing court 
must first determine if the agency reached 
its decision after a full, good faith consid-
eration and balancing of environmental 
factors. The Court must then determine, 
accordin to the standards set forth in §§ 
an o t e Act, whet er t e 
actual balance of costs and benefits that 
was struck was arbitrary or clearly gave 
insufficient weight to environmental values.' 
[Citing Calvert Cliffs Coordinatin~ Committee 
v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. l 71)]" 
(Emphasis added) 
at pg. 300 
The Court cautioned that: 
" ... although this inquiry into the facts 
is to be searching and careful, the ultimate 
standard of review is a narrow one. The 
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. [Citing, 
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 
401 u.s. 402, 416 (1971)]. 11 
30 Environmental Defense Fund v. Corts of 
Eng., U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir.972); 
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 
473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973) [Memorandum, pp. 
22-23]. 
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As to the economic review, Judge Taylor relied 
upon and followed the Eighth Circuit's decision in the Cache 
River case, and the view of the Fourth Circuit as expressed 
by Judge Dalton in the Cape Henry Bird Club case. Judge 
Taylor stated the rule as follows: 
Calculation of the B/C ratio required under 
the Flood Control Act of 1936 and Senate 
Document No. 97 has almost uniformly been 
denied judicial review. United States v. 
West Vir~inia Power Co., 122 F.2d 733 (4th 
Cir. 194 ); cert.den. 314 U.S. 684 (1941); 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng. 
of U. S. Army, 325 F.Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 
1970), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), 
cert.den. 5 ERC 1416 (1973); Environmental 
Defense-Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 
346 (8th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Corps of Eng. of U. S. Army, 348 
F.Supp. 916, 924 (N.D.Miss. 1972); ~ate 
Henrt Bird Club v. Laird, 5 ERC 128 W.D. 
Va .973.) ; contra, MontgomerZ v. Ellis, et 
al, Civil Action No. 71-644 N.D.Ala. 
September 11, 1973). 
We do not view the test enunciated by the 
Eighth Circuit as encompassing a complete 
review of all economic factors involved in 
a project. Matters such as the projected 
electric power benefits, flood control 
benefits, etc. and whether their computation 
conforms to the requirements of Senate Docu-
ment No. 97 are legislative matters and not 
reviewable. 31 
31 Dr. Roberts' testimony concerned almost 
exclusively matters that we find unreviewable 
under NEPA. He stated inter alia that the 
project benefits and costs, the discount rate, 
project life and secondary benefits were all 
arbitrarily calculated. As said in Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng. of U. S. 
Army, 325 F.Supp. 728: 
14 
" .. It is for the Congress to determine, 
in authorizing such a project and in, there-
after, making subsequent appropriations 
therefor, whether the benefits are 'in ex-
cess of the estimated costs.' The Court 
does not believe that it has the authority 
to enjoin the expenditure of appropriated 
funds upon a showing that the benefits 
are less than the estimated cost ... 
* * 
" The methods of calculating cost-benefit 
ratios are innumerable and in many cases 
esoteric. The Court's judgment as to sound 
procedures in this regard might well not be 
in accord with the judgment of Congress. And, 
as stated above, the Court does not believe 
it should, in any event, attempt to substitute 
its judgment for that of the legislature." 
We reject plaintiffs attempt to revive review 
of these matters by way of NEPA's substantive 
review process. Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 
5 ERC 1283 (W.D. Va. 1973) [Memorandum, pp. 24-
25]. 
In the very next paragraph of his opinion, Judge 
Taylor makes it crystal clear that he did fact conduct 
the "partial" review required by the Eighth Circuit rule as 
stated in Cache River. He says specifically: 
Although in denying review of the economic 
computations under Title 33 U.S.C. § 701, 
we note, as did the Eighth Circuit in En-
vironmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehike, 
473 F.Zd 346, 356 (8th Cir. 1972), that 
partial review is available under NEPA. In 
order to fully comply an agency "must re-
appraise the costs and benefits of the proj-
ect in li ht of the olicies of environ-
mental protection oun in NEPA. Emp asis 
added). Hence, any environmental benefits 
claimed by an agency may be scrutinized by 
this Court as it reflects upon whether the 
costs and benefits struck were arbitrary 
according to the standards set forth in 
sections 101 and 102 of NEPA. 
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ments propoun e partles an cone ude 
that defendants' decision to roceed was not 
ar ltrary. In reac lng t is cone usion, t is 
Court is mindful of the narrow scope of its 
review. We have also taken into considera-
tion that the project was authorized several 
years prior to the passage of NEPA, and 
almost $35,000,000 has been expended on the 
project. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps 
of En~., U.S. Army, 470 F.2d 289, 301 (8th 
Cir. 972). 
* * * 
... Further, we have concluded that accord-
ing to the standards set forth in sections 
lOl(b) and 102(1) of NEPA the actual balance 
of costs and benefits struck was not arbitrar 
an ave su icient wei ht to environmenta 
va Memorandum, pp. 25-27 . 
With reference to the testimony of Drs. Roberts 
and Carroll, we wish to point out that their testimony was 
contradicted by that of Dr. M. I. Foster, Director of TVA's 
Division of Navigation Development and Regional Studies, and 
Reed Elliot, Director of TVA's Division of Water Control 
Planning. Dr. Foster, who was Dr. Carroll's former super-
visor, holds a doctor's degree in economics from the Univer-
sity of Florida. Mr. Elliot had the responsibility for prep-
aration of the project planning report for the Tellico 
project. Both of these men have had extensive experience in 
computing benefit-cost ratios under Senate Document No. 97. 
They both testified, and the EIS so states (EIS III-3-1, 
etc.), that the benefit-cost analysis of this project was 
made in accordance with Senate Document No. 97 and the Rules 
and Regulations promulgated by the Water Resources Council, 
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which of course reflect national policy with respect to such 
projects. While it is neither possible nor desirable to attempt 
a review of the enormous mass of evidence introduced at the 
trial on this issue, it may be helpful in understandilng tbe 
district court's decision to make a few pertinent comments on 
that evidence and the court's remarks with respect to it. 
As the court noted in its opinion: 
Much of plaintiffs' proof centered on the 
economic aspects of the project. 
* * 
We can scarcely imagine a more satisfactory disclosure than that contained in final state-
ment. Beside the summary of economic infor-
mation and responses to comments, the entire 
third volume presents detailed economic dis-
cussion of the project both pro and con. A 
study entitled the_ Tennessee Valley Authority's 
Tellico Proiect: A Reappraisal is reprinted in full. T is one hundred and six page docu-
ment was prepared by a group of faculty members 
and students of The University of Tennessee. It investigated three economic aspects of the 
Tellico Project with emphasis on the method of 
estimating the flow of benefits and costs 
resulting from the investment. TVA in the final part of the statement responded to this study. Plaintiffs at trial relied on many of the con-
tentions raised in the report. The treatment 
afforded the economic aspects of the project in the EIS more than suffices the disclosure 
reguirement.s of Section 102 (2) (C) of NEPA. 
* * * 
. . . Indeed, by far the greatest amount of 
testimony on any single topic was given to the debate of the relative economic contentions of 
the parties [Memorandum, pp. 15, 16, 23]. 
Moreover, a substantial part of Dr. Roberts' testi-
mony was an attack on Senate Document No. 97 itself. Perhaps 
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the central thrust of plaintiffs' testimony was that it was 
arbitrary, unrealistic, and not in accord with sound economic 
principles for TVA to use a 3-1/4 percent discount rate and a 
100-year project life in computing the economic costs and 
benefits. Yet none of their witnesses testified that the 
interest rate used was not legal or not in full accordance 
with Senate Document No. 97 and the regulations of the Water 
Resources Council. In fact, the evidence was that the 3-1/4 
percent interest rate is the rate required for this project 
by the regulations of the Council issued December 24, 1968, 
which state that the rate of interest in effect prior to that 
date (3-1/4%) "shall continue to be used for such project until 
construction has been completed, unless the Congress otherwise 
decides" (33 Fed. Reg. 19170 (1968); Ex. 56). Congress has not 
otherwise decided as to Tellico. 
As for the use of a service life of 100 years for the 
project, this, too, is in full accord with Senate Document No. 
97, which states'that the economic evaluation of a project 
shall encompass "the period of time over which the project 
will serve a useful purpose" and that "100 years will normally 
be,considered the upper limit" (Senate Document No. 97, pp. 11-
12). The EIS states that siltation of the reservoir will not 
be a significant factor "for at least 600 years" and that it 
would "take about 900 years for the reservoir to fill to 
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elevation 805" (EIS I-1-12, II-10-2). It is obvious that the 
useful life of this project will far exceed 100 years. 2 
Finally, as to plaintiffs' contention that the eco-
nomic benefit-cost analysis should be recomputed to conform 
to present prices, such a suggestion is not only highly 
impractical and unrealistic but is not required by the law. 
Section 101 of ~EPA does not require that the economic bene-
fits and costs be recomputed, as plaintiffs suggest. This 
section merely places upon the agencies "the continuing 
responsibility to use all practicable means, consistent 
with other essential considerations of national policy, to 
improve and coordinate" their plans and programs to produce a 
better environment. TVA did reexamine the project to see if it 
were still a viable project economically. The EIS states speci-
fically that: 
If the project were to be reevaluated eco-
nomically today, current benefit values should 
be used as well as current discount rates and 
costs. In addition, the most meaningful eval-
uation would be one that takes into account the 
fact that a substantial investment has already 
been made, not one that assumes a situation 
different from that which actually exists. If 
2 · Montgomery v. Ellis (N.D. Ala., Sept. 11, 1973), relied 
on by plaintiffs, is not in point. It was not disputed that 
the government agency involved in that case (SCS) used the 
1965 interest rate instead of the 1971 rate "employed for 
c1;1rrent projects" as prescribed by the Water Resources Coun-
C1l! and used a 100-year life for a stream channelization 
~roJect, although for such a project, use of a 50-year life 
1S c1;1sto~ary. The court held that this was arbitrary. In Tell1c~ 1t was not disputed that TVA used the interest rate 
prescr1bed by the Water Resources Council, and that use of a 
8100-year life for a dam and reservoir project is proper under enate Document No. 97. 
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this were doneb project benefits would exceed 
proiect costs y a wide margin--on the order 
of .5:1 at a 5-3/8 percent discount rate. 
TVA is convinced that the Tellico project has 
very substantial economic value, that it had 
such value when originally planned, and that 
its economic value has increased since the time 
it was planned. Accordingly, from an economic 
standpoint, TVA concludes that the project will 
be a sound and wise investment [EIS III-3-24]. 
TVA also reappraised the project in the light of the 
requirements of NEPA. 
TVA has again carefully considered and 
weighed the economic and environmental bene-
fits and adverse effects of the project and 
has concluded that benefits far outweigh 
adverse effects [EIS, Summary Sheet]. 
In balancing the environmental and economic 
losses and ~ains associated with the project, 
· I have cone uded that any decision other than 
to proceed with the project as designed, with 
the above described modifications, would not 
be warranted or justified. In my judgment 
the economic and environmental gains clearly 
outweigh the losses. In reaching this con-
clusion I have taken into account all of the 
official agency comments, cormnents received 
from other sources, and reviews of members of 
the staff which reviews roduced a s stem-
atic, inter isciplinary ana ysis covering 
both quantified and unguantified environ-
mental amenities and values [TVA General 
Manager's Review and Balancing Report to the 
TVA Board, Ex. 128]. 
Judge Taylor expressly found as a matter of fact that 
this reappraisal was made in good faith and that TVA's decision 
to proceed with the project was in full accord with NEPA: 
· There has been on the art of TVA in reachin 
J.ts · ecl.sJ.on a goo ait 
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An attempt 
In the light of what Judge Taylor said and did, it 
is difficult to understand the basis for plaintiffs' conten-
tion that the court applied the wrong standard of review. 
II 
The District Court Did Not Err in Holding 
that the Tellico Impact Statement 
Is Adequate. 
The question as to what constitutes an adequate 
"detailed" statement within the meaning of section 102(2)(C) 
of NEPA has been extensively discussed by the courts. A brief 
review of the guiding principles, before discussing the 
specifics in the case at bar, would seem to be in order. 
NEPA is to be construed in a reasonable manner. It 
requires discussion of only significant impacts. NEPA does 
not require a perfect impact statement which would satisfy 
everyone, for that is impossible. As said in Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Corps of Engineers, 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. 
Ark.), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 5 
ERG 1416 (1973): 
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The environmental impact statement is not to be e uated to a trial court record which 1s exam1ne on appea y a ig er court. Although the impact statement should, within reason, be as complete as possible, there is nothing to prevent either the agency involved, or the parties opposing proposed agency action, from bringing new or additional information, opinions and arguments to the attention of the 
"upstream" decision-makers even after the final EIS has been forwarded to CEQ. So it is not necessary to dot all the I's and cross all the T's in an impact statement. 
Congress, we must assume, intended and expected the courts to interpret the NEPA in a reason-able manner in order to effectuate its obvious purposes and objectives. It is doubtful that any agency, however objective, however sincere, however well-staffed, and however well-financed, could come up with a perfect environmental impact statement in connection with any major project [342 F. Supp. at 1217]. 
Similarly, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., 
348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 1972): 
Thus a § 102 statement must thoroughly discuss the significant aspects of the probable en-vironmental impact of the proposed agency action. By definition, this excludes the neces-sit for discussin either insi nificant matters, sue as t ose wit out im ort, or remote e ects, sue as mere *oss1 1 1t1es un 1 e y to occur as a result of t e troposed activity. This crite-rion not only ad eres to the CEQ guidelines but comports with a rule of reason: it does not, however, encompass the necessity for disclosing 
"all known possible environmental consequences" [p. 933]. 
The detailed statement required by§ 4332(2)(C) must contain such information as will alert the public, other interested governmental agencies, the Council on Environmental Quality, the President, and the Congress of possible environmental consequences of proposed agency action. Section 4332(2)(C) does not require that ever conceivable stud be erformed and t at eac pro rom every 
angle to explore its every potential for good 
or ill [Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 
440, 444 (W.D. Wis. 1972)]. 
Judge Taylor in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 5 ERG 1669 (E.D. Tenn., July 24, 1973), 
also stated: 
There is no requirement that an impact 
statement be replete with maps, charts and 
other supporting data [p. 1671]. 
Neither should an EIS be an exhaustive collection of 
various and sundry minute scientific descriptive details 
which would likely be confusing to the decision makers and 
apt to miss the focus NEPA sought to achieve. Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., 348 F. Supp. 916 (N.D. Miss. 
1972). 
The purpose of an environmental impact statement is 
to assure that environmental factors are given appropriate 
consideration in the decision making process, along with 
economic and other considerations. Environmental Defense 
Fund v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 339 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. 
Tenn.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 1164 (6th Cir. 1972); Natural Resources 
Defense Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 5 ERG 1669 
(E.D. Tenn. 1973). The "ultimate decision [in this case, to 
complete Tellico] must of course take into account matters 
other than environmental factors." Committee for Nuclear 
Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787 (D.C. Cir. 
1971). 
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"The sole purpose of NEPA is to ensure that the 
environmental effects of a project are given full and adequate 
consideration by the decision maker." Cape Henry Bird Club 
v. Laird, 5 ERG 1283, 1287-88 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd "on 
the basis of the District Court's opinion," F.2d 
(4th Cir. 1973). 
Plaintiffs contend here that the Tellico impact 
statement is deficient in that it fails to adequately discuss 
the following subjects: 
1. Shoreline development 
2. Agricultural losses 
3. Ecological impacts 
4. Historical values 
5. Water quality 
The district court heard extensive testimony of experts on 
all of these matters and found that the statement was adequate 
with respect to all of them. We shall discuss each of them 
in order. 
1. Shoreline development. Judge Taylor devotes 
two and one-half pages of his opinion to this subject (Memo-
randum, pp. 13-15) in which he documents numerous pages in 
the statement and the specific exhibits in which this subject 
is discussed. He also points out that numerous witnesses for 
each side testified about various aspects of this matter. It 
would be futile to attempt a summary, or even a meaningful 
analysis, of the testimony, exhibits, and discussion contained 
in the environmental statement, except to say that the court 
heard it all and considered it all in reaching his conclusion 
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the statement was adequate. It is significant that 
plaintiffs concede TVA's "wealth of expertise" in this area 
(plaintiffs' brief, p. 31). It is obvious that plaintiffs 
are dissatisfied with the fact that the trial judge did not 
accept the opinions of their witnesses. 
We wish also to make three specific comments con-
cerning this subject. First, it should be noted that the 
CEQ Guidelines quoted and relied upon by plaintiffs at pages 
27-29 were not in effect when the Tellico environmental 
statement was prepared, nor when the trial was held. They 
were not issued until August 1, 1973, and provide by their 
own express terms that they apply only to "draft and final 
impact statements filed with the Council after January 28, 
1974" (Environmental Reporter, p. 71:0308; 38 Fed. Reg. 21265 
(Aug. 7, 1973)). 
Second, plaintiffs' discussion of the comments of 
EPA on TVA's draft Tellico statement is grossly inaccurate 
and misleading. The EPA comments quoted in plaintiffs' brief 
at page 32, with respect to industrial and commercial develop-
ment, are taken from EPA's letter of November 12, 1971, and 
refer to "the Timberlake community" which is a proposed com-
prehensive planned community within the project area and 
which is now under study. Timberlake is a wholly separate 
project for which a separate environmental statement will be 
prepared, if and when the project is authorized. At present, 
it is merely under study, and while Congress has appropriated 
funds for the construction of Tellico it has appropriated 
funds only for planning Timberlake. EPA's November 12, 1971, 
letter quoted by plaintiffs was based on EPA's misunderstand-
that "the total [Tellico] project includes the proposed 
timberlake Development as an integral component. 11 
In EPA's later letter of January 10, 1972, set out 
in the EIS at I-3-1, which plaintiffs ignore, EPA recognizes 
its error and acknowledges that there are two projects--
Tellico and Timberlake. Moreover, in a third and later letter 
of August 7, 1972 (Ex. 61), commenting on TVA's final state-
ment, EPA said in part: 
The Environmental Protection Agency has 
reviewed the Final Environmental Impact 
Statement for the Tellico Project. We con-
clude, as the Statement itself indicates, 
that completion of the project is likely to 
result in a substantial alteration of the 
environment through the long-term impacts 
of recreational, residential, and industrial 
development associated with the project and 
designated as Timberlake by TVA. 
We would be quick to acknowledge and congrat-
ulate you and your able staff on the ev~dence 
of f~ne performance demonstrated ~n prepar~ng 
and f~nal~z~ng th~s Env~ronmental Impact 
Statement. 
As pointed out in our letter dated January 10, 
1972, EPA suggested that TVA prepare an over-
view statement to provide the necessary per-
spect~ve aga~nst which the environmental 
effects and alternatives could be assessed 
f~r the Tellico Project and the proposed 
T~mberlake development. Again, we would like 
to acknowledge and compliment TVA in that the 
Final Statement does contain additional 
material concerning both of these projects; 
however, the Final E~. addresses in the 
main, the construction of Tellico Dam and not 
~further detailed assessment of possible 
environmental problems which might arise from 
locating certain major industrial categories 
in the proposed Timberlake development and 
the larger concentration of people and 
associated activities contemplated. The 
impact of urban runoff and other effects, 
even with compliance with State and Federal 
environmental standards, may be significant. 
These effects could be the basis for more 
stringent standards that TVA may want to 
impose. Such standards obviously could 
affect the promised potential of the Timber-
lake development. 
We recognize that TVA, as well as many other 
Federal agencies, labor under a lack of clear 
direction as to how much environmental assess-
ment in an environmental impact statement is 
sufficient. The issue to a large extent 
revolves about what is a com lete ro'ect and 
w at 1s part o a project. 
* * * 
In concluding these comments, we wish to 
expressly extend to TVA our appreciation for 
~our spirit of cooperation and willingness to 
iscuss and demonstrate this project. We look 
forward to a continued close working relation-
ship which can only act as a benefit for the 
environment and mutually support our common 
· goal of enhancement of the environment for all 
Americans.3 
Third, the comments of the Appalachian Regional 
Commission on TVA's draft statement, which plaintiffs quote 
at pages 33 and 34 of their brief, reflect the Commission's 
similar lack of understanding that the Tellico project and 
Timberlake are two separate projects, and that a separate 
environmental statement will be prepared for Timberlake if 
it is undertaken. 
3 ~laintiffs' statement on page 33 of their brief that 
Mr. ~1dwell testified that "in the opinion of EPA" the 
Tell1co EIS did not give sufficient consideration to the 
impacts of shoreline development is untrue. 
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2. Agricultural losses. At page 35 of their 
, plaintiffs complain that the district court "apparently 
disregarded" the testimony of their witness Mr. Robert Sliger 
about the agricultural losses which would result from the 
ect, as for example, "$290 per acre for corn, $1,400 per 
acre for tobacco and $3,200 per acre for tomatoes. 11 We do 
not think it is fair to say that Judge Taylor "disregarded" 
this testimony, but rather that he took it into consideration 
along with the rebuttal testimony of Dr. M. I. Foster, TVA's 
Director of Navigation Development and Regional Studies, and 
the discussion contained in the environmental statement (EIS 
I-1-31; I-1-42; I-1-47; I-3-15; I-3-26 through 27; and 
I-3-105). 
3. Ecological impacts. Plaintiffs' contentions 
that the final EIS does not contain a sufficient discussion 
of the ecological impacts are unfounded. They rest their 
argument on the testimony of their witness Dr. Clebsch and 
the comments of the Department of the Interior on the draft 
statement. 
The short and simple answer to plaintiffs' argument 
is that Dr. Clebsch's testimony was rebutted and contradicted 
by the testimony of several other witnesses, and that the 
comments of the Department of the Interior were addressed to 
TVA's draft statement and not to the final statement. The 
draft statement contained only 27 pages, whereas the final 
statement contained over 600 pages. Moreover, both the 
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The three nationally known archaeologists who re-
viewed the EIS and are referred to by the district court are 
Dr. John Otis Brew of Harvard; Dr. John M. Corbett of Columbia 
(former Chief Archaeologist of the National Park Service); and 
Dr. Robert L. Stephenson of the University of South Carolina 
(former Head of River Basin Surveys for the Smithsonian 
Institution). Their impressive qualifications are set out 
in Exhibit 104, along with their report, which states in part: 
We consider the statement and supporting 
data to be sound and well written. We 
feel that this is an excellent, detailed 
statement which, together with the support-
ing material, gives an accurate and compre-
hensive treatment of this aspect of the 
impact of the project [Memorandum, p. 7]. 
That Judge Taylor did not treat this matter lightly, 
as plaintiffs would have this Court believe, is shown by the 
fact that his memorandum opinion makes specific reference to 
the fact that these matters are discussed (see footnotes 5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of memorandum opinion). Plaintiffs' remark 
that Judge Taylor's opinion "represents an appalling 
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of the values of the area" is a gross insult 
brief, p. 39). The evidence he heard at the 
that TVA will spend $500,000 to restore Chota, 
capital of the Cherokees. Exhibit 103 shows a model 
We believe Judge Taylor fully under-
this testimony. The proof also showed that TVA will 
another $500,000 to protect Fort Loudoun. Exhibit 97 
a model illustrating this protection. Jn addition, 
evidence showed that $467,668 has already been expended 
on archaeological research which the University of Tennessee 
conducting by contract with the National Park Service and 
TVA. 
Finally, it is interesting to see what the Cherokee 
Nation had to say with respect to this matter. It is true, 
as plaintiffs point out, that the Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians adopted a resolution opposing the project, although 
no representative of the Eastern Band appeared as a witness 
at the trial. But it is also true that the Cherokee Nation 
itself commended TVA for its handling of the project.4 The 
testimony showed that the Cherokee Nation appointed a special 
committee of 46 members to make a thorough investigation of 
the entire problem. Prior to this investigation, the General 
4 The undisputed evidence at the trial showed that U.S. 
census figures fix the size of the Eastern Band of Cherokee I~dians at about 3,500 individuals, and Dr. Guthe testified 
It ad~ the Cherokee Nation numbers from 66 000 to 80 000 n 1ans. ' ' 
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for the Cherokee Nation wrote to plaintiffs' counsel 
him of the formation of the Committee and requesting 
information or material which plaintiffs wished to submit 
the Committee (copy of letter was filed as Ex. 100 at the 
trial). Thereafter the Committee filed its report, which was 
later adopted by the Cherokee Nation, and which states in 
part: 
2. Based on the breadth and depth of the 
facts presented to the Sub-Committee regard-
ing the extent of TVA past and ~resent 
interest in historical aspects 1nvolved, 
the visiting Cherokee Sub-Committee found no 
rational basis for further injectin9 the 
Cherokee Nation or Cherokee eo le 1nto the 
controvers1a quest1ons invo ving urt er 
development by TVA of the Little Tennessee 
River basin. 
* * 
4. TVA organization and the Universitk of 
Tennessee, along with the National Par 
Service should be commended for efforts to 
date to explore and develop those identifi-
able Cherokee historic sites and to recover 
satisfactory evidences of the Cherokee past. 
This report was filed as Exhibit 99 at the trial. Also intro-
duced at the trial as Exhibit 98 was a letter from the General 
Counsel of the Cherokee Nation to TVA in which he concludes 
by saying: 
[W]e were much impressed with your 
determination to properly respect the 
interest and concern of the Cherokee 
people. 
It is significant that at no time did the Cherokee 
Nation, or the Eastern Band of the Cherokees, ever suggest that 
TVA's final environmental st~tement did not properly or ade-
quately discuss the historical aspects of the former Cherokee 
villages. 
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S. Water Quality. Plaintiffs' contention that the 
does not adequately discuss water quality is utterly 
without merit, as is their contention that the district court 
error in mistaking quantity of discussion with 
As to the quantity, the court observed: 
No other topic received the attention, at 
least quantitatively, as did the water 
quality aspects of the project [Memorandum, 
p. 12]. 
There is no doubt about the accuracy of this statement, for 
EIS devotes over 100 pages of the discussion to this 
subject. 
As to the quality of this discussion the record is 
even more impressive. Plaintiffs presented only one witness, 
Dr. Thackston, who testified that the discussion was not 
adequate. TVA presented the testimony of Milo A. Churchill, 
former Chief of TVA's Water Control Branch, Division of 
Environmental Research and Development, who holds a master's 
degree in public health from Johns Hopkins, and Dr. Peter 
Ashton Krenkel of Vanderbilt University who holds a doctor's 
degree in sanitary engineering from the University of 
California at Berkley, and is a world renowned authority in 
this field. Milo Churchill's qualifications are described 
in Exhibit 121 and Dr. Krenkel's in Exhibit 122. Both 
Churchill and Dr. Krenkel contradicted the testimony of 
Dr. Thackston and testified that the discussion in the EIS 
was adequate. Dr. Krenkel further testified that TVA's 
reputation for excellence in the field of water quality is 
worldwide and is exceeded by none. 
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The testimony also showed that the organization 
within TVA having primary responsibility for the preparation 
of this portion of the EIS is TVA's Office of Health and 
Environmental Science, which is staffed by over 140 scientists 
including 20 who hold Ph.D degrees (see Ex. 121). The testi-
mony also showed, as pointed out in the district court's 
opinion that 
. . . the water quality aspects of the 
impact statement were reviewed by Dr. Abel 
Wolman of John Hopkins University and Dr. 
Robert L. Ball, Director, Office for 
Research Development, Institute of Water 
Research, Michigan State University [Memo-
randum, p. 12]. 
It is common knowledge that Dr. Abel Wolman is 
recognized throughout the world as one of the most distin-
guished authorities in the field of water quality. 
In the light of these facts, it is difficult to 
understand plaintiffs' contention that the district court was 
confusing quantity with quality. 
III 
The District Court Did Not Err In Holding 
that TVA Had Considered All Reasonable 
Alternatives to the Project. 
Plaintiffs' argument that TVA did not consider and 
adequately discuss in the EIS all reasonable alternatives to 
the project is without substance. All of plaintiffs' argu-
ments, and the evidence presented in support of them, were 
rejected by the district court after considering both the EIS 
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all of the testimony presented at the four-day trial. 
page 54 of their brief that the 
of their witnesses was uncontradicted is simply not 
It is difficult to add to what the district court said 
pages 16 through 19 of its opinion, which states specifi-
cally that it considered all of the alternatives proposed by 
and that they were either not reasonable alter-
were adequately discussed in the EIS. Plaintiffs 
have presented nothing new here, except in effect to ask this 
accept the testimony of their witnesses over that of 
TVA's. 
The EIS points out that TVA carefully examined the 
alternatives to the Tellico project prior to the preparation 
of its draft environmental statement, and then reexamined the 
entire subject after receiving comments on the draft and prior 
to issuing its final EIS. This reexamination included "a 
number of alternatives, including abandonment of the project, 
recreational development of the water resource as a river 
rather than a lake, and construction of one or more low dams 
rather than the one planned" (EIS I-1-1). The evidence showed 
that TVA considered every alternative suggested by those who 
commented on the EIS, including specifically Governor Dunn's 
suggested alternative of abandoning the project and using the 
area as a scenic river development (EIS I-3-42) . TVA responded 
fully and in detail to this proposal in a seven-page letter 
copied in full in the EIS (I-3-45 through 51), pointing out, 
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other things, that the proposal did not present any new 
different factors from those which were fully considered 
and the Congress before construction of the 
was commenced in 1967. TVA also noted that Congress 
that time had appropriated $35,000,000, and TVA had already 
about $30,000,000 on the project. 
In responding to TVA's letter, Governor Dunn, by 
of January 11, 197 2, which was filed in .evidence as 
69, conceded: 
You are correct in your statement that 
the views ex ressed in m revious letter 
ra1se uest1ons t at a not een 
previous y consi ere bt the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and ot ers. The intent 
of my letter was not necessarily to reveal 
new data, but rather to express a different judgment than that reached by the Tennessee 
Valley Authority. 
Plaintiffs' suggested alternative at the trial, 
advanced through Governor Dunn's staff members--that the 
project be abandoned and that the river be developed as a 
scenic stream solely for recreational purposes--was admit-
tedly what the Governor had already proposed and TVA had 
already considered and rejected. 
As for Dr. Carroll's discussion of the development 
of an industrial complex at Florence, Alabama, as an alter-
native, it is sufficient to say that he admitted on cross-
examination that such a development would not be a reasonable 
alternative to the Tellico project in east Tennessee, since 
it would not be of any benefit to the people of east Tennessee. 
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are wrong in stating that Mr. Tully concluded that 
industrial development at Florence, Alabama, would be an 
alternative to the Tellico project (plaintiffs' brief, p. 52). 
the contrary, he was saying that "If the development of 
waterfront industrial sites is, in itself, a desirable or 
necessary activity . . . . " then "In this regard, the Florence 
sites are real alternatives." The point he was making is that 
the Tellico project is much more than the mere development of 
waterfront industrial sites; it involves navigation, flood 
control, recreation, electric power, etc., including the 
enhancement and creation of new jobs in an area of east 
Tennessee that has suffered for years with unemployment and 
the lack of job opportunities, which has resulted in the mass 
out-migration of its young people to other areas. 
With respect to flood plain zoning, TVA's proof, 
including slides introduced as Exhibit 105, was that the area 
in Chattanooga for which the project would provide major flood 
protection is already heavily built upon. TVA's proof also 
showed that both Tellico and levees are needed to provide 
complete protection at Chattanooga, and levees are therefore 
not a substitute for Tellico. Flood insurance (if obtainable) 
obviously is not a substitute for actual protection of a 
built-up area subject to flooding. 
Moreover, Tellico is a half-completed multi-purpose 
project, which will produce navigation, power, recreation, 
fish and wildlife, water supply, shoreline development, 
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redevelopment, and enhanced employment benefits estimated to 
total almost $7,000,000 per year, exclusive of flood control 
benefits estimated at $505,000 per year. This clearly dis-
tinguishes the Tellico situation from that considered in 
Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 
1972), which is relied upon by plaintiffs, but which involved 
merely a channelization project for flood control and drainage 
purposes only. 
The district court heard all the evidence with 
respect to suggested alternatives and concluded: 
The statement as a whole does give suffi-
cient information concerning all reasonable 
alternatives for evaluation of their relative 
merits [Memorandum, p. 19]. 
NEPA does not require the adoption of a particular 
alternative, only a consideration and discussion of reasonable 
alternatives which were available at the time of the project's 
reevaluation. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 5 ERC 1316 (E.D. Tenn. 1973). With respect 
to alternatives, NEPA also must be construed in the light of 
reason. Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., 470 F.2d 
289 (8th Cir. 1972). As said in Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 
5 ERC 1283 (W.D. Va. 1973), aff'd "on the basis of the 
,~listrict court's opinion," __ F. 2d __ (4th Cir. 1973): 
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is unnecessary 
In considering alternatives, TVA was, of course, 
justified in taking into consideration the advanced stage 
completion of the Tellico project. As said by this Court 
upholding the preliminary injunction in the present case: 
[T]he amount of completed construction or investment will certainly affect the ultimate determination whether modifications should be 
made in the project or whether the project 
should be abandoned . . [468 F.2d 1164, 
1179 (6th Cir. 1972)]. 
Similarly, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., 
of 
in 
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 5 ERC 1416 (1973), 
the court said: 
Several courts have held that an agency involved in an ongoing federal project may 
approach the required compliance with § 102 differently from what might be required with 
respect to new projects .. 
. . . We have also taken into account, as we 
must, that the overall project was authorized by Congress eleven years prior to the passage 
of NEPA, and was sixty-three percent completed 
at the date this action was instituted. Almost 
ten million dollars has been expended and would be lost if the project were completely aban-doned now. 
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We therefore, affirm the judgment of the 
trial court for the reasons set forth in 
the opinion [470 F.2d at 295, 301]. 
In concluding, we wish to point out, as we have done 
previously, that the CEQ Guidelines quoted by plaintiffs at 
-page 47 of their brief, were not in effect when the EIS was 
prepared, and will not be in effect until January 28, 1974. 
IV 
The District Court Did Not Err in 
Holding that TVA Had Com}lied 
wit Section 102(2)(B. 
Plaintiffs' witness Dr. Roberts produced computa-
tions which he claimed showed a dollar quantification for the 
environmental loss in the flooding of a former Indian village, 
and suggested that similar dollar quantifications could be 
developed for other environmental losses. The district court 
rejected both the quantification and the implication that 
an agency is required by NEPA to produce computations for 
every dollar loss, saying: 
... nowhere in Section 102(2)(B) is an 
agency required to compute in dollar figures 
every environmental loss. This section 
merely requires methods and procedures be 
developed for appropriate consideration of 
presently unquantified amenities, not the 
development of a procedure of mathematical 
equivalence as urged by plaintiffs. This 
is not to say that if methods exist for 
more exact evaluation of environmental 
losses an agency need not adopt them [Memo-
randum, p. 21]. 
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Plaintiffs' brief (p. 56) now disclaims the position 
that TVA was obligated to develop dollar quantifications for 
all environmental losses, and says instead that "the court 
indicated" that TVA has not developed procedures for considera-
,tion of presently unquantified amenities, and that TVA pre-
sented no evidence that it had done so. 
This is simply not true. The court made no such 
indication as plaintiffs attribute to it. The court's comments 
quoted above were obviously directed to Dr. Roberts' testimony. 
TVA's published procedures .for implementing NEPA expressly 
call for appropriate consideration of unquantified environ-
mental amenities. TVA's General Manager, Lynn Seeber, testi-
fied specifically that these TVA procedures were adopted 
after consultations with CEQ and published in the Federal 
Register on November 2, 1971 (36 Fed. Reg. 21010) (Exhibit 
127). He further testified that before these procedures 
became effective, CEQ invited comments on them through notice 
in the Federal Register (36 Fed. Reg. 23666), but received 
no comments from EDF or any other plaintiff herein. Mr. Seeber 
also testified that in accordance with these procedures, 
unquantified environmental amenities were given appropriate 
consideration in the agency decision making process relating 
to Tellico. See also Mr. Seeber's affidavit, admitted as 
Exhibit 125, and his "balancing memorandum," admitted as 
Exhibit 128. 
This, as the district court held, fully meets the 
requirements of section 102(2)(B) of NEPA. 
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The District Court Did Not Err in 
Hold-
ing that the Federal Water Pollutio
n 
Control Act Amendments of October 
1972 were Inapplicable. 
Plaintiffs say (brief, p. 57) that the dis
trict 
court's ruling on this point is in
consistent with its earlier 
action overruling TVA's motion to 
dismiss their eighth cause 
of action dealing with the matter. 
This is not true. The 
record shows that after TVA filed 
a motion to dismiss the 
complaint, which at the time cons
isted of six causes of 
action, plaintiffs were permitted 
to amend by adding a seventh 
and eighth cause of action; that T
VA answered these counts 
denying the applicability of this 
Act; and that accordingly, 
the court had no occasion to rule 
on these counts until after 
the trial. 
that: 
The court was clearly correct in h
olding after trial 
. . . 
plaintiffs claim under the Federal
 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendm
ents of 
1972 is without merit. We feel th
at this 
Act has no application under the f
acts of 
this case [Memorandum, p. 26]. 
Section 313 of the Federal Water P
ollution Control 
Act Amendments of October 1972 (FWPCA) pro
vides in pertinent 
part: 
Each department, agency, or instru
mentality 
of the executive, legislative, and
 judicial 
branches of the Federal Government
 (1) having 
jurisdiction over any property or facility, 
or 
(2) engaged in any activity resulting, or 
which 
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may result, in the discharge or runoff of 
2ollutants shall comply with Federal, State, 
~nterstate, and local requirements respecting 
control and abatement of pollution to the 
same extent that any person is subject to 
such requirements, including the payment of 
reasonable service charges. The President 
may exempt any effluent source of any depart-
ment, agency or instrumentality in the execu-
tive branch from compliance with any such a 
requirement if he determines it to be in the 
paramount interest of the United States to do 
so ... [33 U.S.C. § 1323 (Supp. II, 1972)]. 
Other portions of the Act, similarly, show that what it is 
concerned with is regulating the discharge of pollutants. 
Section 301 provides: 
Except as in compliance with this section 
and sections 1312, 1316, 1317, 1328, 1342, 
and 1344 of this title, the discharge of 
anl Tollutant by any person shall be unlaw-
fu 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. II, 1972)]. 
Sections 30l(b),5 302,6 306,7 and 3078 provide for setting 
effluent limitations which, if adhered to, render an other-
wise prohibited discharge lawful. Section 3189 permits 
certain discharges from aqua-culture projects. Sections 
40210 and 404,11 respectively, establish permit requirements 
for the discharge of pollutants from point sources and for 
the discharge of dredged or fill material into navigable 
waters. "Discharge" is specifically defined in the Act: 
5 33 U.S.C. § 13ll(b) (Supp. II, 1972). 
6 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (Supp. II, 1972). 
7 33 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. II, 1972). 
8 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (Supp. II, 1972). 
9 33 U.S.C. § 1328 (Supp. II, 1972). 
10 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (Supp. II, 1972). 
11 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (Supp. II, 1972). 
L_~~---------4-3 _____ ____ 
The term "discharge of a pollutant" an
d 
the term 11 discharge of pollutants" eac
h 
means (A) any addition of any pollutant 
to navigable waters from ant point sou
rce, 
(B) any addition of any pol utant to the 
waters of the contiguous zone or the o
cean 
from any ¥oint source other than a ve
ssel 
or other loating craft [§ 502(12), 33 
U.S.C. § 1362(12) (Supp. II, 1972)].12 
While heat "discharged into waters' is
 defined 
as a pollutant in section 1362(6), and while the 
evidence and 
the EIS showed that the water temperat
ure of the Tellico 
Reservoir would be increased, the unco
ntradicted evidence was 
that this would be the result of the n
atural warming of the 
water by the earth and sun and is not 
heat "discharged into 
water." Consequently, as the district
 court held, the Act 
has no application to the facts of thi
s case. 
VI 
The District Court Did Not Err in 
Holding that TVA Has Complied 
with the National Historic 
Preservation Act. 
Plaintiffs alleged in their amended co
mplaint that 
TVA failed to comply with the National
 Historic Preservation 
Act with respect to Fort Loudoun, whic
h was the only structure 
12 Senator Muskie, chief sponsor of 
the 1972 Amendments in 
the Senate, said in an analysis of the
 conference amendment, 
"The term 'discharge' is a word of art
 in the legisla-
tion. It refers to the actual dischar
 e from a oint source 
into the navigable water~s~.~t~e~r~r~~~t~o~r~~~a~~s~e~
a~s~o~r-=7t~e~o~c-e~a~n~s~-
~ Gong. Rec. 816876 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1972
)). 
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in the project area on the National 
Register at the time the 
EIS was filed. The undisput
ed proof at the trial showed
 that 
TVA had complied with this A
ct and the court so found, s
aying: 
Both the EIS and the evidenc
e show that 
TVA is in full compliance w
ith this Act. 
As to the indian villages no
minated on 
~ugust 30, 1973 for inclusio
n in the 
National Register, TVA has 
not yet had 
the opportunity to comply w
ith the Act 
but stated at trial it fully
 intended to 
do so [Memorandum, p. 26]. 
The evidence at the trial wa
s that, due in part to the e
fforts 
of plaintiffs' counsel, the
 two former Cherokee village
 sites 
mentioned by the court were 
nominated and included on th
e 
National Register approxima
tely two weeks before trial. 
TVA's 
General Manager testified th
at TVA had not yet had an op
por-
tunity to respond to the nom
inations and follow the admi
nis-
trative procedures involved,
 but that it would do so ac
cording 
to the proper administrative
 procedures.l3 
13 The district court fou
nd, with respect to all of 
the 
former Indian village sites,
 including specificaiiY the
 two 
sites nominated on August 30
, 1973, that TVA, in complia
nce 
with NEPA, had fully taken i
nto account, and adequately
 dis-
cussed the impact of the pro
ject upon such sites. The National 
Historic Preservation Act re
quires essentially only the
 same, 
so that compliance with NEPA
 is automatic compliance wi
th that 
Act. See Environmental Def
ense Fund v. CorEs of Eng., 
325 
F. Supp. 749, 754 (E.D. Ark. 1971)
, aff'd, 70 F.2d 289 (8th 
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 5 ERC 14
16 (1973); Environmental 
Defense Fund v. Froehlke, 47
3 F.2d 346, 356 (8th Cir. 1972); 
Env~ronmental Defense Fund v. 
Corls of Eng., 348 F. Supp. 
916, 
921-22, n.4 (N.D. Miss. 1972). A 
so, the evidence before the 
district court was undispute
d that although both the dr
aft and 
final EIS were sent to the N
ational Advisory Council on 
Historic 
Preservation and the State o
f Tennessee, neither commen
ted with 
respect to any of the forme
r village sites. 
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Plaintiffs in their brief (p. 61) now interpret the 
district court's memorandum as holding "that TVA had not 
complied with the Act" as to the two Indian villages. Their 
position appears to be that if sites can be added on the eve 
of trial, as to which TVA has had no opportunity to take the 
required statutory steps, TVA is thereby put in violation of 
the Act and it must be presumed, in the face of direct testi-
mony to the contrary, that TVA will not comply with it in 
the future. We do not consider that such an argument requires 
any response. 
VII 
The District Court Correctly Dismissed 
Plaintiffs' Claim Based on 
the Ninth Amendment. 
Plaintiffs' "Fifth Cause of Action," which the court 
dismissed, was a claim that the Fifth and Ninth Amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States in effect prohibit 
the building of Tellico Dam because it would infringe upon 
plaintiffs' right to enjoy the environment in its natural 
state--free from governmental disturbance. No case has ever 
held that such claim has any validity. On the contrary, 
every court that has considered the claim has summarily 
rejected it, which fact plaintiffs conceded below. In addi-
tion to the present action, identical claims were made, and 
dismissed, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Corps of Eng., 
325 F. Supp. 728, 739 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 
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(8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 5 
ERC 1416 (1973); Environ-
mental Defense Fund v. Ten
nessee Valley Authority, 4 
ERC 
1892-94 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); Enviro
nmental Defense Fund v. 
Corps of Eng., 348 F. Supp
. 916, 921 n.4 (N.D. Miss. 1972);
 
and United States v. 247.37
 Acres, 3 ERC 1098, 1102 (S.D. 
Ohio 1971). See also Tanner v. A
rmco Steel Corp., 340 F. 
Supp. 532, 535 (S.D. Tex. 1972). 
provides: 
VIII 
The District Court Did Not 
Err 
in Denaing Plaintiffs Costs
 
an Attorney Fees. 
Rule 54(d) of the Federal Rules o
f Civil Procedure 
Except when express prov~s
~on therefor 
is made either in a statute
 of the United 
States or in these rules, c
osts shall be 
allowed as of course to the
 prevailing 
party unless the court oth
erwise directs; 
but costs against the Unite
d States, its 
officers, and agencies sha
ll be imposea-
only to the extent permitt
ed by law. 
The district court followed
 this statute by awarding p
laintiffs 
their costs through the pr
eliminary injunction, as to which 
they had prevailed, and by 
awarding TVA its costs for 
the 
balance of the case, as to 
which it had prevailed. 
Plaintiffs say that this a
llocation of costs was 
improper but do not say why
. Their primary argument 
is that 
they should have been award
ed attorney fees, which the
 district 
court denied. Here again, 
the applicable statute--28 
U.S.C. 
§ 2412--is very specific: 
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Exce t as otherwise s ecificall rovided
 
y statute, a ju gment or costs, as 
enumerated in section 1920 of this title 
but not including the fees and expenses o
f 
attorneys may be awarded to the prevailin
g 
party in any civil action brought by or 
against the United States or any agency .
 
of the United States . . . . 
Plaintiffs' basic contention is that this
 statutory 
provision is inapplicable because TVA is 
not an "agency of 
the United States." This contention is w
ithout substance. 
Section 19 of the TVA Act specifically ch
aracterizes TVA as 
"an instrumentality and agency of the Governt
tt~P.t of the 
I -~ , ' 
I " ' ' 
United States for the purpose of executin
g \i0constitutional ' 
powers."l4 Its status as such an agency
 of the United States 
has been recognized time and again by the
 courts. See, ~. 
Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
297 U.S. 288, 315 
(1936) ("an agency of the Federal Government"); Ten
nessee 
Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
306 U.S. 118, 134 
(1939) ("an instrumentality of the United States");
 United 
States v. An Easement and Right-of-Way, E
tc., 246 F. Supp. 
263, 269 (W.D. Ky. 1956), aff'd "for the reasons s
tated and 
upon the authorities set forth in the op
inion of the district 
court," 375 F.2d 120, 121 (6th Cir. 1967) ("a whol
ly-owned 
corporate agency and instrumentality of t
he United States"); 
Posey v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 93 F
.2d 726, 727 (5th 
Cir. 1937) ("plainly a governmental agency of the 
United 
States"). 
14 16 U.S.C. § 83lr. 
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Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 4
51 specifically defines
 
·"agency" for purposes 
of Title 28 generally a
s follows: 
The term "agency" inclu
des any . . . 
corporation in which th
e United States 
has a proprietary inter
est . . . 
This certainly includes
 TVA. 
The cases cited by plai
ntiffs are wholly inapp
osite. 
None of them allowed an
 award of attorneys' fe
es against a 
government agency exce
pt Natural Resources D
efense Council 
v. Environmental Protec
tion Agency, 5 ERC 1891
 (1st Cir. 
1973), involving the Clean A
ir Act which, unlike NE
PA, 
expressly permits asses
sment of attorneys' fe
es against 
agencies of the United 
States. As the court t
here expressly 
stated: 
To award attorneys' fee
s against a ~overn­
mental agency, we must 
first find t at 
Congress has given s¥ec
ific statutory 
sanction. Here, wein
d such sanction in 
the language of the Cle
an Air Amendments 
themselves [p. 1893]. 
With respect to the two
 TVA cases cited by pla
in-
tiffs, United States ex
 rel. TVA v. Pressnell,
 328 F.2d 580 
(6th Cir. 1964), had nothing 
to do with attorneys' f
ees nor 
TVA's status as a feder
al agency under 28 U. Sr. 
C. § 451 or 
§ 2412. Natural Resour
ces Defense Council v. 
Tennessee 
Valley Authority, 459 F
.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1972), did 
not hold 
that TVA was not a fede
ral agency; rather, it 
held that the 
legislative history of 
the venue provisions of
 28 U.S.C. 
49 
§ 139l(e) showed that it was intended to apply solely to 
federal agencies previously suable only in the District of 
Columbia, and that TVA was not that "sort of federal agency" 
(p. 259) . 
This case is directly in point, however, on the 
cost question raised by plaintiffs since the Second Circuit 
allowed costs to TVA as the prevailing party against the 
environmental organizations (including EDF) there involved, 
and specifically denied a motion by these organizations that 
TVA's costs not be assessed against them but that each party 
bear its own costs. A copy of the court's order on this 
point is attached. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the 
district court should be affirmed. 
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